



**Vermont Renewable Power
Supply Acquisition Authority**

Study Results and Conclusions

November 13, 2003

Topics for Discussion

- Background and State Objectives
- Focus of the Study
- Bankruptcy Status
- Asset Profile
- Base Case Assumptions
- Financial Structure
- Executive Session
 - Discussions with Municipals, IOUs and Potential Partners
 - Valuation
 - Probabilities of Success
- Risks and Benefits
- Conclusions
- Alternative Paths Forward

Background and State Objectives

- The Vermont Renewable Power Supply Authority was created by the Vermont legislature to:
 - Prepare due diligence and feasibility studies regarding the purchase of hydroelectric dams and related assets on the Connecticut and Deerfield rivers
 - Complete the studies and present its recommendations to Finance, Commerce and Natural Resources and Energy committees by December 1, 2003
 - Enter into negotiations for a potential purchase with the consent of the Governor and submitted to the General Assembly for consideration
- Among the potential advantages of such an acquisition considered were:
 - Securing a stable source of low cost power for the Citizens of Vermont and businesses in or looking to locate in Vermont
 - Supporting a major local source of renewable energy
 - Capitalize on tax advantages, including tax-exempt revenue bonds and a federal-income-tax-free Authority to own the assets

Focus of the Study

- USGen bankruptcy research and monitoring
- Fair Market Valuation
 - Hydrological and generation characteristics
 - Research revenue, expenses, and comparable transactions from public sources
 - Cost of capital estimation by Lexecon and through discussions with investment bankers
- Research power needs
 - In State (municipal and private)
 - Out of State (municipal and cooperatives)
- Obtain indicative interest from potential partners
 - Joint Ownership
 - Power contracts
 - Operating and Marketing Contract
- Financial feasibility of purchase by State entity
 - Tax exempt financing structures and State capability for credit backstop
 - Partnership structures, including taxable scenarios
 - Operating scenario analysis, downside risk and upside potential
- Ongoing evaluation of ability to satisfy State objectives
- Ongoing feedback to VRPSAA

Bankruptcy Process and Status

- PG&E and six wholly-owned subsidiaries, including USGen New England, filed for Chapter 11 protection on July 8, 2003.
- USGen New England:
 - The entity is income positive but variable, generating \$8.0 million in net income in August and \$277 thousand in September
 - 90% of revenue is contract based, principally standard offer supply to National Grid affiliates, expiring in 2004
 - current book value of property, plant and equipment is \$1.5 billion
- The bankruptcy restructuring plan remains in the development stage
 - Creditors have asked for both an ongoing entity and a liquidation plan, but no decisions will not likely be reached until 1st Quarter 2004.
 - We understand that interest in all of USGen NE's assets has been expressed by at least two acquirors (based on unsolicited interest).
 - Vermont's interest in the hydros has been registered with Alvarez & Marsal and Lazard Freres, who will conduct any asset sales.

USGen NE Assets


Facility	Capacity (MW)	Fuel	Location
Brayton Point	1,599	Coal /Oil	Somerset, MA
Salem Harbor	745	Coal /Oil	Salem, MA
Bear Swamp	573	Hydro-Pumped Storage	Monroe Bridge, MA
CT and Deerfield River Systems	573	Hydro	VT, NH, MA
Manchester Street	495	Natural Gas	Providence, RI
Total	3,985		

Source: PG&E NEG Website.

Potential Paths for the Hydros

1. USGen-NE emerges from bankruptcy as an ongoing entity, no divestiture
2. Sale of equity in USGen-NE (requires a partner for Vermont)
3. Sale of all assets bundled together (requires a partner for Vermont)
4. Sale of individual assets or asset groups (cleanest option for Vermont)

HYDRO ASSET OVERVIEW




Operating Assumptions for Base Case


Unchanged from October 2 presentation, except:

- Slightly lower Base Case natural gas price forecast
- Lower ISO-NE power prices as a result
- Expense items are substantially unchanged
 - Property Tax study completed
 - Capital Expenditures for lower CT River FERC relicensing updated


Natural Gas / Electric Price Assumptions (2003 Dollars)




Forecast Energy Price Received by the Project




River Flow Assumptions




Hydroelectric Generation Profile - Monthly



Vermont Supply and Demand Profile - Capacity



Vermont Supply and Demand Profile - Energy



Discussions with Potential Private Partners

- Private parties have expressed interest in teaming with Vermont in the following ways:
 - Joint equity participation
 - Power marketing
 - O&M services
 - PPA back to Vermont
- Private parties are interested in partnering with Vermont because:
 - Enhances bid profile
 - Enhances financing
 - Vermont seen as an aggregator of potential load for the facilities
 - Power of a local presence

Why Own With a Partner?

- Fills in core competencies
 - O&M services
 - Power marketing
 - Experience in bidding for generation assets
 - Bankruptcy process experience
- Allows better match of VT's ownership share to VT's need for power
- Potentially provides up-front equity to transaction
- Provides a built-in potential source of additional capital if needed

Financing Assumptions

Private Buyer Case

- 12.3% after-tax cost of capital for private buyer; consisting of:
 - 18.0% equity cost; 9.0% debt cost


Vermont Buyer Case

- Tax-exempt revenue bonds
 - Output ultimately sold to municipals or to IOUs/spot for limited duration
 - Limited “moral obligation” of State assumed
 - Bond insurance possible but not assumed
- 7.0% debt cost for issuing agency


Municipal Buyer Case

- 5.0% General Obligation bonds issued at each municipality


Private Activity Bonds - Volume Cap Allocated



Private Activity Bonds - Volume Cap Used




State of Vermont Net Debt Outstanding



Total at June 30, 2003: \$448.2 Million


Acquisition Structure #1

Vermont Merchant Model




Acquisition Structure #2

Vermont Contract Model




Acquisition Structure #3a

Joint Ownership Model




Acquisition Structure #3b

Joint Ownership Model



Acquisition Structure #4

Purchased Power Model



Acquisition Model Comparisons

Structure	Pro's	Con's
#1 Vermont Merchant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Most flexibility for directing the output and benefits to Vermont •Execution simplified (ex. financing) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Requires State credit support •IOU contracts limited to 3 years •Uncertain of tax-exempt status •Most commercial risk •State's credit rating may be impacted
#2 Vermont Contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Committed contracts support financing •Reduced commercial risk •Vermont share sized to contractual commitments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Developing contractual agreements adds to transaction complexity •Vermont benefits may be diluted with PPA agreements •Counterparty credit risks
#3 Joint Ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Credit of the joint owners supports financing •Reduced commercial risk •Vermont share sized to ownership commitments •Joint owners share execution risks/costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Developing joint ownership agreements adds to transaction complexity •Interests of the joint owners can diverge over time and be wieldy to manage
#4 Purchased Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Least commercial risk •Vermont share sized to contractual commitments •Buyer assumes all execution risks/costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Benefits may be diluted with PPA agreements •Securitization of the contract introduces counterparty credit risk

Probabilities of Success

Bankruptcy Outcome	Structure and Financing	Prevailing in Bid	Combined
Ongoing Entity 25%	NA	NA	0%
Equity or All Assets Combined 25%	50%	20%	2.5%
Asset Groups including Hydro breakout 50%	50%	20%	5%
TOTAL			7.5%

Risks of Ownership

- Market price risk
 - Risk of price decline in New England power market
 - Scenarios quantify loss of value
- Marketing and operating Risk
 - Inability to fulfill contracted power supplies
 - Mechanical failure causes power loss and cost of repair
 - Scenarios quantify loss of value
- FERC license renewal risk
 - 80% of MW are under license until 2037 and 2042
 - FERC license expires 2018 for the remaining 20% (lower CT)
 - License renewals may contain flow restriction and/or required capital additions
- State ownership risks
 - Reduction in State credit rating if MO or GO is used
 - Operational suboptimization
- Counterparty credit risk
 - Purchase power agreements
 - Partnership agreement
 - O&M and marketing agreements

Benefits of Ownership

- Potential for significant net economic benefits to the State
- Price hedge for participating utilities and their customers – operating expenses and financing costs are relatively fixed
- Source of non-fossil and renewable energy
- Environmental / watershed control
- Industrial development through favorable power sale arrangements or indirect support mechanisms (eg: power price offset)

Execution Considerations

- Assets are encumbered in an uncertain bankruptcy process
 - Bankruptcy process does not ensure availability
 - If available, part of larger integrated asset portfolio
 - Auction will be competitive with an uncertain outcome
- Negotiating agreements with partners or power purchasers adds to transaction complexity (will vary with structure)
 - Joint ownership agreement terms
 - Power purchase agreements
 - Operating and marketing agreements
- Financing will require State credit support or contracts with credit worthy entities for most or all output
 - State reluctant to place taxpayers at risk (GO or MO) or forego other programs (volume cap)
 - Tax-exempt options have requirements that may be difficult to achieve

Conclusions

- There is a low probability of Vermont assembling a viable transaction, having the opportunity to bid on the assets it desires, and prevailing in a competitive auction.
- The capacity of the hydro assets is large in relation to Vermont's total electric capacity requirements (52%), but more reasonable from an energy perspective (25%) and smaller than the existing Hydro Quebec or Vermont Yankee energy component.
- Existing interest from Vermont's utilities is insufficient to support a 100% purchase, but a purchase could potentially be structured through joint ownership or a State-level investment.
- The analysis indicates a substantial net economic benefit to the State of Vermont from ownership, largely derived through its lower cost financing. Some of this benefit may also be realized through contracting at a lower level of commercial risk.
- Once purchased, the risks of ownership are manageable
 - Primary risks are power price risk and FERC relicensing risk
 - Scenario analysis projects that these risks are within quantified benefits
- The contract approach (Model # 2) is the basis for successful public power agencies, but would require Vermont to get out in front of the bankruptcy process and bring together a portfolio of suitable PPA's matched to 75% or more of the capacity to proceed.
- The most manageable commercial options for Vermont are either joint ownership or purchasing the output from the eventual owner (Models 3 and 4).

Alternative Paths Forward

- I. Discontinue activity at the State level
 - Leave it to the Vermont municipal and investor-owned utilities to pursue contract or ownership options at their discretion
 - Provide complete information to Vermont's municipal and investor-owned utilities from the study
 - Monitor the USGen bankruptcy process and report back to the Legislature if a change in circumstances improves the probability for a successful acquisition

- II. Pursue a path forward to improve the probabilities of success
 - Continue discussions with commercial partners and municipalities (Structures 2, 3 and 4), and work toward a definitive structure and commercial terms (MOU)
 - Develop an acceptable financing plan
 - Proactively monitor the USGen bankruptcy process
 - Re-estimate the costs and benefits based on a firm structure and report back to the Legislature